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I. PARTIES 
1. Tom Watkins. Appellant. Full name: George Thomas Watkins. Plaintiff below. 
2. Henry Day Ford. Appellee. Henry Day Ford, Inc. is a Utah corporation. Defendant 
below. 
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1. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that the Contracts between Watkins and Henry 
Day Ford were a Clear and Unambiguous Expression of the Parties' Intent, and that 
because the Contracts referred to the "GT40" instead of "GT," Henry Day Ford did not 
Breach the Contracts when Ford Motor Co. Allocated to it Two Ford 
"GTs" 12 
A. Terms in a Written Contract for the Sale of Goods may be Explained by the 
Parties even though the Written Contract Recites that it is a Final Expression of 
the Parties' Intent 14 
B. The Court, Under Traditional Utah Rules of Contract Interpretation, May and 
Should Consider Extrinsic Evidence to Determine what the Parties Intended by 
the Reference to "GT40" in their Contracts. Furthermore, the term "GT40" as 
used by the Parties in March 2002 is not an Unambiguous Reference to a Model 
other than the one that Ford Introduced in Early 2002 as the "GT40" but later put 
into Production and Marketed as the "GT." 16 
C. The Parties" Use of the Term "GT40" in their Contracts was Ambiguous and, 
when Considered in Light of All the Circumstances, Refers to the Future 
Production and Marketing by Ford Motor Co. of the Concept Car it Introduced at 
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the North American International Auto Show in January 2002 as the "GT40," and 
which it Subsequently Put into Production as the "GT." 20 
D. The Existence of an Integration Clause in the Contracts Does Nothing to 
Clarify what the Parties Meant by their Reference to "GT40." Moreover, an 
Integration Clause does not Bar Resort to Extrinsic Evidence to Interpret the 
Parties' Intentions 26 
2. The Evidence Before the Trial Court Did Not Establish a "Distinct Intent" by Tom 
Watkins to Waive his Contractual Right to Purchase Two Ford GT40s, or Ford GTs as 
they were later named. Nor did the Evidence that was before the Court Establish an 
Abandonment of his Contractual Rights 28 
A. Waiver is the Intentional Relinquishment of a Known Right 30 
B. Abandonment of a Contractual Right is the Intentional Relinquishment of 
One's Rights in a Contract 33 
C. Because Waiver and Abandonment present Mixed Questions of Fact and Law, 
an Appellant who Challenges a Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions as to 
Waiver and Abandonment, must Marshall the Evidence and Argument In Favor of 
the Court's Findings and Conclusions 33 
D. What facts and argument support the trial court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law that Watkins distinctly intended to waive his contractual 
rights? 33 
E. The Evidence and Argument as Marshaled, does not Establish a Distinct 
Intention by Watkins to Waive his Contractual 
Rights 36 
F. Henry Day Ford did not at Trial Prove that it was Prejudiced by Watkins 
Demand in June 2005 that it Sell to Him the Two Ford GTs it had been 
Allocated 42 
G. Henry Day Ford May Not Claim that Watkins Waived his Contractual Rights 
Where its False Representation was the Foundation for Watkins' Alleged 
Waiver 43 
3. The Trial Court Erred in Finding that Henry Day Ford's Offer to Sell Watkins a Ford 
GT After this Action was Filed Constituted a Failure of Plaintiff to Mitigate his 
Damages 45 
li 
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4. The Court of Appeals Should Vacate the Trial Court's Award and Judgment 
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The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code § 78A-3-
102 (3)(j). The Utah Supreme Court has transferred this appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Utah Code. § 78A-3-102(4). The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to 
UtahCode§78A-3-102(2)(j). 
V. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that the parties' reference to "GT40" in then-
contracts was clear and unambiguous; that according to the plain meaning of the contracts Henry 
Day Ford agreed only to sell to Watkins up to two "GT40s" if it was allocated them; and that 
because the vehicles that Ford later allocated to Henry Day Ford were "GTs," not "GT40s," that 
Henry Day Ford did not breach its contracts with Watkins when it refused to sell him the two 
Ford "GTs" that Ford had allocated to it? See Conclusions of Law nos. 1-6 and 11. R629, 635-
636. A trial Court's interpretation of terms used in a written contract is reviewed for correctness, 
with no deference given to the trial court's interpretation. Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Hughes, 2009 UT 27, 
f21, 207 P.3d 1235 (2007). A trial court's conclusion that the terms in a written contract are or 
are not ambiguous also is a question of law, is reviewed for correctness, and is also accorded no 
deference. WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Service Corp.. 2002 UT 88 Tfl9, 54 P. 3d 1139 
(2002); Peterson v. Sunrider, 48 P.3d 918, 924 (Utah 2002). Watkins argued below that the 
reference in his contracts to "GT40" referred to the concept car that Ford Motor Co. introduced 
in January 2002 as the Ford GT40, announced that it would put into production, and later 
marketed and distributed to its dealers as the Ford "GT." See Trial Brief, R. 551-554, 556-557; 
opening argument, Tr. 17; closing argument, Tr. 153-155. Watkins thus reserved his right to 
appeal the trial court's interpretation of the word "GT40." 
2 
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2. Did the trial court err in finding and concluding that Tom Watkins waived and/or 
abandoned his contractual right to purchase from Henry Day Ford up to two Ford GT40s (later 
marketed as the Ford GT) at MSRP, on occurrence of the condition precedent that Ford Motor 
Company would subsequently allocate one or more Ford GT40s/ GTs to Henry Day Ford, 
because Tom Watkins negotiated a check presented to him by Henry Day Ford in the amount of 
his prior down payment, where Henry Day Ford represented that it was returning the $2000 to 
Watkins because Ford Motor Co. would not be allocating to it any of the vehicles? Whether a 
party has waived or abandoned his contractual rights is a mixed question of law and fact. 
According to Pledger and Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ]fl6, 982 P. 2d 572 "[waiver' presents mixed 
questions of law and fact: whether the trial court employed the proper standard of waiver 
presents a legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or events allegedly 
supporting waiver that are factual in nature should be reviewed as factual determinations." 
Watkins argued below that he had not waived or abandoned his established rights. Trial Brief, 
R. 549, 556-559; Closing Argument, R. 153, 156-160. Watkins thus preserved his right on 
appeal to challenge the court's conclusions that he did waive or abandon his rights. 
3. Did the trial court err in concluding Watkins' rejection of Henry Day Ford's offer, 
made after this action was filed, to sell him a Ford GT at MSRP, established Watkins' failure to 
mitigate his damages? The court's conclusion in this regard, although framed as a Finding of 
Fact (no. 39) is actually a conclusion of law. As such, it is reviewed for correctness and is 
accorded no deference. The entire factual testimony on which the court's "finding" of failure to 
mitigate damages consisted of Tom Watkins' answers to questions on "recross-examination." Tr. 
107. As far as Watkins has been able to discern, neither party in closing argument addressed 
3 
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failure to mitigate damages. The point was not presented or argued in Henry Day Ford's Trial 
Brief. R. 540. The trial court's findings on failure to mitigate damages, frankly, came as a 
surprise to Watkins. The trial court, given its other findings and conclusions, also did not reach 
the issue of damages. Under the circumstances, Watkins should be allowed on appeal the 
conclusion of law that the trial court applied to his testimony at Tr. 107. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Tom Watkins filed this action on July 1, 2005. Complaint, R. 1. Watkins' principal 
cause of action against Henry Day Ford was for breach of contract. Although the Complaint 
included an alternative claim for specific performance, Watkins elected prior to trial to seek 
damages. 
2. Henry Day Ford answered the Complaint on July 12, 2005. R.10. 
3. Discovery commenced soon thereafter, with both parties participating. 
4. On June 14, 2007, Henry Day Ford moved for summary judgment. R.69. Watkins 
opposed the motion. R. 117. The Court (Henriod, J.) by Order dated January 10, 2009, denied 
Henry Day Ford's dispositive motion. R.234. 
5. On June 5, 2008, this case was assigned to Judge Medley. R. 243. 
6. On October 13, 2008, Henry Day Ford filed a renewed Motion for Summary 
Judgment. R. 335. Watkins again opposed the motion. R. 255. Again, the Court (Medley, J.) 
denied Henry Day Ford's dispositive motion. Minute Entry, R. 475; Order, R. 476. 
7. In its Order denying for a second time Henry Day Ford's motion for summary 
judgment, the Court stated, with respect to Henry Day Ford's affirmative defenses of failure of 
4 
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consideration and waiver: 
Further, the Court finds that the mutual promises alone between 
the parties served as consideration for the contracts and that the receipt 
by Plaintiff of the deposit specifically referenced in the subject contracts, 
without objection or reservation, did not cause the contracts to be 
unenforceable based upon failure of consideration. Finally, the Court 
finds that Plaintiffs cashing of the check from Defendant presents issues 
of fact as to waiver and/or termination such that it cannot be ruled on by 
summary judgment. 
R.477. 
8. This case was tried to the Bench on March 3, 2009. Minutes of Bench Trial and 
record of exhibits offered and received, R. 564- 567. 
9. Subsequent to trial, the Court asked the parties to submit memoranda regarding a 
person's duty to speak on penalty that a person's silence might constitute waiver. Watkins' 
response, in the form of a letter, is found at R.567A. Henry Day Ford's response is found at 
R.568. 
10. On May 5, 2009, the Court (Medley, J.) entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, which were in Henry Day Ford's favor. R. 629-637; copy attached to this Brief as 
Addendum "A." 
11. On May 27, 2009, the court entered a Judgment and Order which dismissed Watkins' 
claims and causes of action, and awarded Henry Day Ford attorneys fees in the sum of $28,585. 
11. Watkins, on June 25, 2009, filed a Notice of Appeal. 
VII. APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At the 2002 North American International Auto Show in Detroit, in January 2002, Ford 
Motor Company unveiled the Ford GT40 concept car, which was based on the Ford GT40 that 
5 
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Ford had built and successfully raced in the mid -1960's at LeMans. Watkins, Trial Transcript 
(hereafter "Tr.") 38:20-39:16 and 54: 9-17; see also Defendant's Trial Exhibit 12 (copy attached 
hereto at Addendum "D"). Ford announced that it intended to put the concept car, which it 
identified at the Detroit Auto Show as the GT40, into production and that it would manufacture a 
limited number of the vehicles. Watkins, Tr. 39: 13-16; Defendant's Trial Exhibit 12. Ford, at 
the time, did not indicate when the vehicles would be distributed to its dealerships. 
Tom Watkins, who owns a motor vehicle dealership, although not a Ford dealership, 
learned about Ford's announcement from reading reports of the Detroit Auto Show in various 
trade publications to which he subscribed. On learning of Ford's plan to put the GT40 concept 
car into production, Watkins inquired at numerous Ford dealerships, initially without success, in 
an effort to locate a dealer who might take his order for a GT40. Watkins, Tr. 41:18 - 43:14. 
About March 2, 2002, Watkins met with Steve Kersey, Henry Day Ford's Commercial 
Sales Manager. Watkins, Tr. 44:3; Kersey, Tr. 114:9-13. Watkins inquired if Henry Day Ford 
might be allocated any Ford GT40s and, if yes, would it sell him one? Watkins, Tr. 44:4-21. Mr. 
Kersey subsequently advised Watkins that Henry Day Ford might be allocated one, perhaps two 
GT40s, although it was not certain it would be allocated any. Kersey indicated that if Ford 
allocated to it any GT 40s, it would be willing to sell them to Watkins. Watkins, Tr. 46:6-13. 
Watkins knew that the concept car that Ford had introduced at Detroit still had to be put 
into production, and anticipated that it might be several years before the GT40 would be 
available for sale to the public. Watkins, Tr. 40:13-18. As Ford had announced it planned a 
limited production run, Watkins understood that not every Ford dealer would be allocated one or 
more Ford GT40s, and that Ford Motor Co. might not allocate any of the limited production 
6 
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vehicles to Henry Day Ford. Watkins, Tr. 45:15-18. Kersey and Watkins discussed that it might 
take two years or more before the GT40 would be delivered to dealers. Watkins, Tr. 45:24-46:5; 
see also Finding of Fact no. 18 (R.631), finding that: 
18.. . at the time the parties executed the Contracts, defendant was 
uncertain as to when or if it would receive the GT 40's. Plaintiff 
believed that at the time the Contracts were executed that it could 
take as long as two years for defendant to receive the Ford GT 40?s. 
Watkins offered to purchase two Ford GT40s for manufacturer's suggested retail price 
("MSRP"), should Ford later allocate the vehicles to Henry Day Ford. Watkins also offered to 
pay Henry Day Ford and it agreed to accept $1000 as a down payment toward the purchase of 
each vehicle. 
Henry Day Ford prepared two written motor vehicle contracts of sale (the "Contracts") 
dated March 4, 2002. Watkins signed both written Contracts, as did Kersey on behalf of Henry 
Day Ford. Each Contract specified a down payment in the amount of $1,000. The Contracts did 
not specify a model year for the vehicle, as the parties did not know when the vehicle would 
enter production. The Contracts also did not specify a delivery date, because neither party could 
be sure when Ford would begin delivery of the vehicles to its dealers. 
Watkins, on March 4, 2002, gave Henry Day Ford a personal check for $2,000 which 
was the amount of the down payments on which the parties agreed. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 3. 
The next day the parties, consistent with their earlier discussion, amended their contracts to 
include the words "purchase for MSRP."1 Watkins, Tr. 49: 12-50:18; Kersey, Tr. 112:19-
113:21; Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 2 (copy of Contracts attached hereto at Addendum "B"). 
U
'MSRP" stands for manufacturer's suggested retail price 
7 
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Watkins, as of March 4, 2002, understood that Ford might not ever allocate any GT40s to 
Henry Day Ford, in which case it would have none to sell to him. Watkins, Tr. 51:22- 25. Henry 
Day Ford cautioned Watkins that it might not be allocated any Ford GT40s, in which case it 
would have none to sell to him. Kersey, Tr. I l l : 14-29. It did, though, believe that it was 
possible that it might be allocated the vehicles that Ford had announced as the GT40. Kersey, 
Tr. 111:14-112:6. Watkins understood that if Ford Motor Co. did not ever allocate any of the 
vehicles to Henry Day Ford, then Henry Day Ford would have no duty to find for him and sell to 
him a Ford GT40. Watkins, Tr. 52:1-3. 
In early January 2003, Watkins received in the mail from Henry Day Ford a check 
payable to Watkins for $2,000, accompanied by a letter that said, "[e]nclosed please find a check 
for the refund of deposit on your vehicle order. We regret to inform you that our allocation is 
not going to allow us to receive this vehicle." See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 4; Addendum "C" 
hereto. There was no restrictive indorsement on the check. Believing Henry Day Ford's 
representation that it would not be receiving the vehicles identified by the Contracts, Watkins 
negotiated the check. Watkins, Tr. 52:15-53:8. 
Henry Day Ford did not ask that Watkins release it of its contractual obligation, subject 
to the condition precedent it and Watkins had identified. Watkins did not agree to release Henry 
Day Ford of its obligation, although he did believe based on Henry Day Ford's representation 
that it would not be receiving any Ford GT 40s. 
Having been told by Henry Day Ford that it would not be receiving any of the vehicle he 
had agreed to buy if Henry Day Ford got any, Watkins renewed his search, calling multiple 
dealers in Utah and outside Utah. He found no one, however, who was willing to sign a binding 
8 
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agreement to sell to him one of the vehicles- if they were allocated one. Watkins, Tr. 53:13-
54:1. 
Sometime between January 2002 and the Fall of 2004, when the vehicle went into 
production and deliveries began to dealers, Ford Motor Co. changed the name of the concept car 
it had introduced at Detroit as the GT40 to, simply, the "GT." Defendants' Trial Exhibit 12. 
Addendum "D". Although now referred to as the "GT," it was the same vehicle that Ford had 
introduced in early 2002 as the "GT40". Id.; see also Kersey testimony, Tr. 112:14-18. The first 
production model delivered to selected dealers was the 2005 Ford GT. 
Henry Day Ford's representation to Watkins that "our allocation is not going to allow us 
to receive the vehicle" turned out not to be true. Ford Motor Co. allocated the limited number of 
Ford GTs it produced to dealers who won certain awards. Even at the time Henry Day Ford 
delivered its letter to Watkins, Henry Day Ford knew that it was possible that it would be 
allocated what was then still known as the GT 40 if it won one of the awards, Day, Tr. 148-149. 
Henry Day Ford maintained at trial that it thought it unlikely that it would win any awards. 
Notwithstanding its professed pessimism, Henry Day Ford received the "Presidents Award," 
awarded by Ford for calendar years 2003 and 2004. It also earned Ford's "Share of the Nation" 
award, based on its sales performance in 2003. As a consequence of earning these awards, Ford 
allocated and sold to Henry Day Ford three Ford GTs. 
Ford Motor Co. invoiced Henry Day Ford for a white 2005 Ford GT Coupe about 
December 9, 2004 which it later delivered to Henry Day Ford. MSRP for the vehicle was set by 
Ford at $156,595. Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 12. Henry Day Ford did not disclose to Watkins its 
allocation or receipt of the vehicle. Instead, Henry Day Ford's owner, Mike Day, kept the white 
9 
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GT for his personal use. 
Ford allocated to Henry Day Ford a second Ford GT six months later, on or about May 
31, 2005 - a red 2005 Ford GT Coupe. MSRP was set by Ford at $156,945. Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit 13. Again, Henry Day Ford did not disclose to Watkins its allocation of the vehicle. 
On June 8, 2005, one of Watkins' employees mentioned to Watkins that she had heard 
that Henry Day Ford had received two Ford GTs. Watkins, Tr. 54:18 - 55:4. Until then, 
Watkins did not know that Ford Motor Co. had allocated to Henry Day Ford any Ford GTs. Tr. 
55:5-14. Watkins immediately went to Henry Day Ford, insisted that Henry Day Ford fulfill its 
obligations under the Contracts and sell him two Ford GTs for MSRP. Id.Watkins, who had his 
checkbook with him, offered to write a check for the two Ford GTs at MSRP. Henry Day Ford 
refused Watkins' tender and refused to sell him either of the two vehicles it had been allocated, 
informing Watkins that their Contracts were no longer valid. Watkins, Tr. 56: 1-13. It did, 
though, offer to sell him the white Ford GT that it had been allocated if Watkins would pay 
Henry Day Ford $250,000 instead of MSRP. Watkins, Tr. 58:2- 59:10; 100: 6-11. 
Watkins filed this action soon after Henry Day Ford rejected Watkins' tender of MSRP 
for the two vehicles. Henry Day Ford subsequently sold the red 2005 Ford GT it was allocated 
to a car dealer in Washington, for $206,000. Day, Tr. 130:20 - 131:22; 136:18-25. Only 
sometime after this action was filed, and the market value of Ford GTs had dropped 
significantly, did Henry Day Ford offer to sell to Watkins one of the GTs it had received, for 
MSRP. 
VIII. NATURE OF THE PARTIES' CONTRACTS 
The promise by Henry Day Ford to sell Watkins one, possibly two, Ford GT40s, or 
10 
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"GTs" as the vehicle was later called, was subject to a condition precedent: that being Ford 
Motor Company's non-guaranteed future allocation to Henry Day Ford of one or two Ford GTs 
once the model went into production. A condition precedent "calls for the performance of some 
act or the happening of some event after a contract is entered into and upon the 
performance or happening of which its obligations are made to depend." Commercial Union 
Associates v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 29, 37 (Utah App. 1993) (emphasis added); Associated Inv. Co. 
v. Cavias. 55 Utah 377, 185 P. 778, 779 (1919); 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 458 (1981). 
"Whether a promise is conditional depends upon the parties' intent, which is derived from 
a fair and reasonable construction of the language used in light of all the circumstances 
when the parties executed the contract." Commercial Union, 38 (emphasis added). 
In the instant case, the parties clearly intended the contracts for the sale and purchase of 
one or more Ford GTs to be subject to a condition. Jeremy Day told Steve Kersey to tell 
Watkins that it was not an SVT dealer and it might not be allocated any GT40s, but if it did it 
would sell up to two to Watkins. Watkins likewise understood that Henry Day Ford might not 
be allocated any of Ford's newly announced sports car, but if it did Watkins would purchase up 
to two at MSRP. 
This case is, in some respects, similar to Koenen v. Royal Buick Co., 162 Ariz. 376, 783 
P.2d 822 (Ariz. App. 1989). Koenen involved a buyer's quest to purchase a Buick GNX, a 
limited edition vehicle. The Buick GNX was the quickest limited production car in the United 
States at the time, and Buick made only 500. Koenen approached Royal Buick before the 
dealership knew if it would be allocated any GNX's and said he wanted to buy one. Royal 
agreed to sell Koenen a GNX for MSRP, which Koenen agreed to pay. The parties signed a 
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purchase order. Royal, in all, took orders from three different people for GNX's. Later, Buick 
told Royal it would be allocated one. In characterizing the nature of the contract between 
Koenen and Royal, the court held that Royal's contractual duty to sell Koenen a Buick GNX was 
subject to a condition precedent; that being Buick's allocation to it of a GNX. Koenen, 183 P.2d 
827 n. 5. According to the Arizona Court of Appeals: 
Koenen suggests that the only question as to availability was whether 
Royal Buck would receive a GNX automobile to sell to Koenen. 
We agree that this is the only reasonable interpretation to be placed 
upon this term contained in the purchase order. The receipt of the GNX 
then becomes a condition to Royal Buick's duty to perform. 
Koenen, 783 P. 2d 827 (emphasis added). The court of appeals agreed with the trial court, which 
had "concluded that had Royal Buick not received a GNX, no breach of contract would have 
occurred." Id., n.5. On receipt of a GNX and realization of the condition precedent, though, 
Royal had a contractual duty to sell to Koenen the GNX it had been allocated, and which it 
received. 
Performance of a duty, or promise to perform subject to a condition becomes due only if 
the condition occurs (or the promisor excuses the occurrence of the condition). Restatement 
(Second) Contracts § 225(1). Had Ford Motor Co. not ever allocated any Ford GTs to Henry 
Day Ford, Henry Day Ford would have had no obligation to sell any Ford GTs to Watkins. Id. 
at §225(2). 
The trial court's findings of fact recognized the conditional nature of the parties' 
agreement, finding that: 
Though defendant did not have any GT 40?s on its lot, nor did the 
dealership know if it would be allocated any GT 40fs to sell, at that 
time Mr. Kersey was given permission to enter into a contract(s) 
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to sell plaintiff Ford GT40 automobiles, if such vehicles were allotted 
to defendant. 
Finding of Fact no. 8 (R.630); see also Findings of Fact nos. 9 (R.630) (". . . defendant would 
sell the plaintiff two (2) GT40 automobiles if defendant was allocated the vehicles"); and 18 
(R.632) (finding that, "at the time the parties executed the contracts, defendant was uncertain as 
to when or if it would receive the Ford GT40s . . ."). 
Henry Day Ford's contractual obligation to sell to Watkins one or more Ford GTs came 
into existence the moment Ford Motor Co. allocated and then delivered to Henry Day Ford the 
first Ford GT, assuming (1) that that was the vehicle for which the parties had contracted and (2) 
that Watkins had not waived his right to purchase it. 
IX. ARGUMENTS ON APPEAL 
1. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding that the Contracts between Watkins and 
Henry Day Ford were a Clear and Unambiguous Expression of the Parties' Intent and that 
because the Contracts referred to the "GT40" instead of "GT," Henry Day Ford did not 
Breach the Contracts when Ford Motor Co. Allocated to it Two Ford "GTs". 
Although Ford Motor Co., commencing in late 2004, allocated to Henry Day Ford the 
first of three Ford GTs2, Henry Day Ford claimed it had no duty to sell to Watkins the first two 
Ford GTs it received because its unambiguous obligation was to sell to Watkins up to two Ford 
GT40s - and even then only if Ford subsequently allocated to it Ford GT40s. gee Henry Day 
Ford's Trial Brief, R. 540, 544-545; Opening Argument, Tr. 10-12; Closing Argument, Tr. 162-
2
 See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibits 12 (Ford invoice for white 2005 Ford GT Coupe, dated 
December 9, 2004); 13 (Ford invoice for red 2005 Ford GT Coupe), dated May 31, 2005); 14 
(Ford invoice for 2006 Ford GT Coupe, dated December 9, 2005); 7-10 (letters by Ford Motor 
Co. to Henry Day Ford advising that Henry Day Ford had earned allocations of the 
aforementioned Ford GTs). 
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165. Henry Day Ford contends that the references in its March 2002 contracts with Watkins to 
the "GT40" were clear and unambiguous, that the contracts were integrated, and that the courts 
cannot, therefore, consider extrinsic evidence to try and determine what the parties meant by the 
term "GT40". Henry Day Ford maintains that as the three "GTs" it was allocated were not 
"GT40s," it cannot have breached its written contracts with Watkins. 
The trial court embraced and adopted Henry Day Ford's argument at Conclusions of Law 
1-6 and 11, which state as follows: 
1. The Contracts are clear and unambiguous and were intended to be 
the final and complete expression of the parties' bargain. 
2. The Contracts between the parties are integrated agreements. 
3. The Court is required to interpret the parties' contracts based upon 
the plain meaning contained in the Contracts. 
4. The Contracts provided that defendant was to sell to 
plaintiff a "Ford GT 40". 
5. Defendant has not been allocated a Ford GT 40 and, as 
such, defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts and, 
as such, plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed. 
6. The Contracts specifically provide that plaintiff contracted 
to purchase two (2) "Ford GT 40" automobiles. Plaintiff 
now claims that he contracted to purchase Ford GT 
automobiles, which claim differs from the actual Contracts. 
11. Defendant did not breach the parties' Contracts and, as 
such, plaintiffs Complaint must be dismissed. 
Conclusions of Law, R. 635-636. A trial Court's interpretation of terms used in a written 
contract is reviewed for correctness, with no deference given to the trial court's interpretation. 
Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Hughes, 2009 UT 27, U 21, 207 P. 3d 1235 (2007). A trial court's conclusion 
that the terms in a written contract are or are not ambiguous also is a question of law, is 
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reviewed for correctness, and is also accorded no deference. WebBank v. American Gen. 
Annuity Service Corp.. 2002 UT 88, TJ19, 54 P.3d 1139 (2002); Peterson v. Sunrider Corp, 48 
P.3d 918, 924 (Utah 2002). 
A. Terms in a Written Contract for the Sale of Goods may be Explained by the 
Parties even though the Written Contract Recites that it is a Final Expression of the 
Parties'Intent. 
As motor vehicles are "goods," agreements concerning their sale are governed by Article 
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 67 Am.Jur.2d Sales § 52 (2003). Utah Code §70A-2-202 
(as amended 2007), which addresses application of the parol evidence rule to the sale of goods, 
provides that: 
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the 
parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended 
by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect 
to such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by 
evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral 
agreement but may be explained or supplemented: 
(1) By course of performance, course of dealing, 
or usage of trade (Section 70A-la-303) or by course 
of performance (Section 70A-2-208); and 
(2) By evidence of consistent additional terms 
unless the court finds the writing to have been 
intended also as a complete and exclusive statement 
of the terms of the agreement. 
Emphasis added. Section 70A-2-202 thus provides that even when there exists a "writing 
intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement," it can nonetheless be explained 
or supplemented by "course of performance," "course of dealing," or "by evidence of consistent 
additional terms..." This provision of the Uniform Commercial Code, according to the Ohio 
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Court of Appeals, "does not exclude consideration of extrinsic evidence about communications 
that express the intentions of the parties." Camargo Cadillac Co. v. Garfield Enterprises, Inc., 3 
Ohio App. 3d 435, 445 N.E.2d 1141,1144 (1982). Some courts have held, in interpreting 
Section 2-202, that agreements containing an integration clause may constitute a complete and 
"integrated" agreement as to some terms, but not as to others. Id, 445 N.E.2d at 439. 
According to Quinn's treatise on the Uniform Commercial Code, Section 2-202 does not 
use the term "integrated." As such, the search for meaning of a term in a written contract for the 
sale of goods is not constrained by a recital in the written contract that the parties' entire 
agreement is contained within the written document itself. According to Quinn: 
The parol evidence rule does not use the term "integration." It 
speaks, rather, in terms of "finality," "completeness," and 
"exclusivity." Under the Code, for maximum protection of the 
language used in the document, the document must be "finalized." 
That is to say, the terms "set forth in writing" must qualify as a 
final expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as 
are included therein" (2-202). If "final," the writing must also be 
"intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms 
of the agreement" (2-202(b) (emphasis added)). 
Quinn, Quinn's Uniform Commercial Code Commentary and Law Digest, §2-202 [A][l][a] at 2-
158 to 2-159 (2d ed. 2002). 
Although the contracts that Henry Day Ford prepared, and which it and Watkins signed 
include an integration clause, the contracts were clearly not intended to be a "final expression" 
of the parties' agreement. The subject matter of the parties' agreement was a concept car that 
Ford had recently announced that it intended to put into production and make available to its 
dealers. Its design had not been finalized, and production had not yet begun. See, "From 
Concept to Production: GT40 to GT," Defendant's Trial Exhibit 12. The parties, at the time they 
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made their contracts did not know how long it would be before the vehicles would be delivered 
to dealers. Accordingly, the parties' contracts did not designate a delivery date, a model year, or 
any other specific attributes of the vehicles. The contract was not intended as a final expression 
of all terms; and certainly not the meaning to be ascribed to "GT40". 
B. The Court, Under Traditional Utah Rules of Contract Interpretation, May and 
Should Consider Extrinsic Evidence to Determine what the Parties Intended by the 
Reference to "GT40" in their Contracts. Furthermore, the term "GT40" as used by 
the Parties in March 2002 is not an Unambiguous Reference to a Model other than 
the one that Ford Introduced in Early 2002 as the "GT40" but later put into 
Production and Marketed as the "GT." 
The overriding principle in the interpretation of contracts is and should be to determine 
what the parties intended by the use of terms they chose for inclusion in their contracts. 5 Corbin 
on Contracts, §24.7 at 37(1998). The parties' intentions should be determined in light of "the 
same situation in which the parties found themselves at the time of contracting." Ward v. 
Intermountain Farmers Assn., 907 P.2d 264, 268 (1995) (quoting Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. 
G.W. Thomas Dravage & Rigging Co., 69 Cal.2d 33, 442 P.2d 641, 69 Cal. Rprtr. 561 (Cal. 
1968). Determination of intent, furthermore, should consider the surrounding circumstances, 
i.e., the context in which the agreement was made. According to the Restatement (Second) 
Contracts, §202(1) (1981): 
Words and other conduct are interpreted in light of all the 
circumstances, and if the principal purpose of the parties 
is ascertainable it is given great weight. 
According to the Utah Supreme Court: 
While there is Utah law that espouses a stricter application of 
the [parol evidence] rule and would restrict a determination of 
whether ambiguity exists to a judge's determination of the 
meaning of the writing itself, the better- reasoned approach is 
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to consider the writing in light of the surrounding circumstances. 
Ward, 268 (emphasis added). 
Utah rules of contract interpretation, outside of Utah Code §70A-2-202, do not, as Henry 
Day Ford contends, preclude consideration of extrinsic evidence to determine (1) that the parties' 
use of the term "GT40" in their contracts was ambiguous and (2) what the parties meant by their 
reference to "GT40." An interpretation of "GT40" does not begin, and end, as Henry Day Ford 
suggests, within "the four corners" of the two written contracts that comprise Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit 2. "In determining whether a contract is ambiguous the court is not bound to consider 
only the language of the contract." Peterson v. Sunrider Corp.. 2002 UT 43, 48 P.3d 918, 919 
(Utah 2002). 
A contractual term "is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of uncertain terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." Daines 
v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, TJ25, 190 P.3d 1269; WebBank ^20 (emphasis added). In determining 
whether contract terms are ambiguous, " any relevant and credible evidence offered to show the 
parties' intention ought to be considered." Ward, 268. This may include extrinsic evidence 
outside "the four corners" of a written contract. "Rational interpretation [of contact terms] 
requires at least a preliminary consideration of all credible evidence offered to prove the 
intention of the parties . . . so that the court can place itself in the same situation in which the 
parties found themselves at the time of contracting." Ward, 268. 
Utah, as the above authorities indicate, no longer follows (if it ever did) a strict, 
mechanistic application of a parol evidence rule that precludes consideration of any evidence 
outside the four corners of a written contract to determine the parties' intent, and meaning of 
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contract terms. The Utah Supreme Court recently clarified what it believes to be the proper 
approach to determining whether terms used in contracts are ambiguous, and what the parties 
meant by them. Daines, ]flf24-37. It did so by explaining and clarifying its 1995 decision in 
Ward, in which the meaning of the words "of safflower" was at issue: 
In Ward we set forth a two-part standard for determining facial 
ambiguity. First, we indicated that "[w]hen determining 
whether a contract is ambiguous, any relevant evidence must 
be considered. Otherwise, the determination of ambiguity is 
inherently one sided, namely, it is based solely on the 'extrinsic 
evidence of the judge's own linguistic education and experience;" 
Ward, 907 P. 2d at 268 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Dravage & 
Rigging Co., 69 Cal. 2d 33. 69 Cal Rptr. 561, 442 P. 2d 641, 643 
(Cal. 1968)). Second, after a judge considers relevant and credible 
evidence of contrary interpretations, the judge must ensure that 
"the interpretations contended for are reasonably supported by the 
language of the contract." Ward 907 P.2d at 268. 
In articulating the Ward rule, we sought to establish a balanced, 
"better- reasoned" approach to an analysis of facial ambiguity 
that would allow judges to "consider the writing in the light of 
the surrounding circumstances." Id. However, we did not intend 
that a judge allow surrounding circumstances to create ambiguity 
where the language of a contract would not otherwise permit. 
Daines v. Vincent, 2008 UT ffl[26, 27 (emphasis added). 
According to the Utah Supreme Court in Daines, in addressing in Ward the meaning of 
the phrase "of safflower," "we considered the extrinsic evidence offered by Ward in order to 
view the 'writing in light of the surrounding circumstances.'" Daines, |28 (quoting Ward at 
268). Nonetheless, interpretations that are advocated by the parties "must be 'reasonably 
supported by the language of the contract,'" Daines, ]f30 (quoting Ward, at 268). 
After reviewing the evidence offered, the Ward rule 
justifies a finding of ambiguity only if the competing interpretations 
are "reasonably supported by the language of the contract." Ward, 
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907 P.2d at 268. 
* * * 
Thus, even though we permit admission of extrinsic evidence to 
support a claim of ambiguity in contractual language, the claim 
"must be plausible and reasonable in light of the language used." 
First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch. Inc.. 966 P. 2d 834. 837 
(Utah 1998 V 
Dames, ^31. 
In a perfect world, perhaps, all material terms used in a contract would be clear and 
unambiguous. Key terms, though, are often not clear, especially to persons (judges and juries for 
example) who were not present when contracts were made and did not participate in the 
negotiations that preceded the contract. According to Corbin: 
Words and acts are merely symbols of expression. No person can 
determine the meaning of written words merely by gluing his or 
her eyes within the four corners of a square paper. It is human 
beings who give meanings to words, and words in themselves 
have no meaning. When a judge refuses to consider relevant extrinsic 
evidence on the ground that the meaning of stated words is 
plain and clear, that decision is formed by and wholly based 
upon the completely extrinsic evidence of the judge's own personal 
education and experience. 
5 Corbin on Contracts, §24.7 at 39 (1998). Even terms which purport to identify the subject 
matter of the contract may be unclear and ambiguous. In such cases, courts in Utah have 
permitted the consideration of extrinsic evidence outside the "four corners of the contract" in 
order to determine the meaning of such terms. See e.g.. Deep Creek Ranch. LLC v. Utah State 
Armory Board. 2008 UT 3, ^13-16, 178 P.3d 886 (resort to extrinsic evidence to determine the 
parties' intended meaning of the term "surplus property"); Smith v. Smith. 1999 UT App 29 
(resort to extrinsic evidence to determine what was meant by reference in a divorce decree to 
husband's "IBEW pension," in which wife was given a half interest), 
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C. The Parties' Use of the Term "GT40" in their Contracts was Ambiguous and, when 
Considered in Light of All the Circumstances, Refers to the Future Production and 
Marketing by Ford Motor Co. of the Concept Car it Introduced at the North American 
International Auto Show in January 2002 as the "GT40," and which it Subsequently Put 
into Production as the "GT." 
What is a Ford "GT40"? Clearly, the parties' contracts refer to the "GT40" as the 
subject matter of the contracts. See Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 2. One contract obligated Henry 
Day Ford to sell, and Watkins to buy the "1 s t GT40 ordered by Henry Day Ford." The second 
obligated Henry Day Ford to sell and Watkins to buy the "2nd GT40 ordered by Henry Day 
Ford." "GT40" however, has no "plain meaning" to be found within the "four corners" of the 
contract, especially considering that Ford, subsequent to January 2002, did not deliver to its 
dealers models designated expressly as GT40s. 
Both of Henry Day Ford's witnesses testified, in response to questions by its counsel that 
Ford had allocated to Henry Day Ford and it had received three Ford GTs as a result of it earning 
certain awards, but that Ford had not allocated to it and it had not received any Ford GT40s. 
Steve Kersey, Tr. 118:25- 119:1; Jeremy Day, Tr. 139:2-5, 145:23-25. Henry Day Ford at trial, 
though, did not offer any explanation (at least not when being examined by its own counsel), as 
to what it understood "GT40" to mean in March 2002 when it wrote up contracts that used that 
term. 
Henry Day Ford tried in its opening argument to invoke the "parol evidence rule," 
contending that the unambiguous subject matter of the contracts was the "GT40," and that the 
court did not need to look beyond the four corners of the contracts to determine that as the 
contracts unambiguously referred to "GT40s," it could not have breached the contracts on its 
subsequent allocation and receipt of two Ford "GTs." Tr. 10-12; see also Henry Day Ford's 
21 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Trial Brief, R. 540, 545-546. The trial court, curiously, given its conclusions of law 1-6 and 11, 
did not exclude at trial evidence of "surrounding circumstances" or testimony concerning what 
the parties meant by the reference to "GT40" in their contracts. Noting the existence of 
"possible" ambiguity in the contract language, the trial court indicated that it preferred to 
proceed and listen to the evidence the parties wished to present. Tr. 11-12. 
Henry Day Ford, at trial, presented no evidence that the Ford "GTs" that it later received 
were a vehicle and model other than that which Ford in early 2002 introduced as the GT40 at the 
North American Auto Show, announced would be put into production, and which it later made 
available to its dealers as the Ford "GT." In fact, the evidence at trial, including the testimony of 
Henry Day Ford's witnesses and its Trial Exhibit 12 (Addendum "D" hereto), indicated that the 
Ford "GT," which was allocated and delivered to Ford dealers commencing in late 2004, was the 
same vehicle that Ford introduced in January 2002 as the GT40 at the North American 
International Auto Show. 
First and perhaps of greatest significance in determining the meaning that Henry Day 
Ford ascribed to "GT40" when it prepared the contracts, is Steve Kersey's testimony. Kersey 
testified that he understood the Ford GT was the same vehicle that he, in preparing the 
contracts, had referred to as the Ford GT40. 
Q. [by Watkins' attorney]: Now you understood that the 
automobiles that were the subject of these contracts was 
the yet to be produced Ford GT concept car or the 
GT40 as it was called at that time, correct? 
A. [Kersey]: Yes. 
Tr. 112:14-18. 
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Jeremy Day, a co-owner and general manager of Henry Day Ford,3 reluctantly conceded 
that the Ford GT was the same vehicle that Ford Motor Company had initially introduced as the 
FordGT40: 
Q. [by Watkins'attorney]: As of the date of that letter, 
December 314, you knew that dealers winning those 
awards5 would qualify for cars. 
A. [Day]: What I knew is that's what our zone rep had told 
me, yes. It was - it was - 1 would not receive a GT 40, but 
if we won one of these two awards, we could receive the 
GT. 
Q. The GT had earlier been introduced as the GT 40, had it 
not? 
A. I'm not sure. I mean, I didn't - 1 didn't watch the trade 
shows or whatnot. I believe so. I think evidence says that 
it was, yes. 
Tr.l26:25-127:9. 
As to the subject matter of the two contracts, Tom Watkins testified: 
Q. [ by Watkins' attorney]. The automobile is described as series and body 
type as GT40. Did you discuss with Mr. Kersey that designation? 
A. Yes. We both referred to the car as GT40. 
Q. And why is that? 
A. Because that was its name at the time. 
3
 Tr. 122: 7-16 
4
 Question refers to Henry Day Ford's letter to Tom Watkins dated December 31, 2002, 
in which Henry Day Ford informed Watkins that "our allocation is not going to allow us to 
receive this vehicle." Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 4. 
5The "President's Award" and the "Share of the Nation Award." Transcript, 124:14-
125:15; 126:14-18. See also Plaintiffs Trial Exhibits 7-9. 
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Tr. 47: 9-13. 
The "clincher," though, is Defendant's Trial Exhibit 12, which indicates unequivocally 
that the Ford GT40 and the Ford GT are the same vehicle. Defendant's Exhibit 12, a Ford 
Motor Co. bulletin captioned "From Concept to Production: GT40 to Ford GT," Exhibit "D" 
hereto, confirms that the vehicle, which by the time it reached the marketplace had been 
redesignated as the "Ford GT,' is the same vehicle Ford Motor Co. introduced at the 2002 North 
American International Auto Show as the "Ford GT40" concept car. Ford Motor Company, in 
the course of design and production of the vehicle, shortened the name of the vehicle to Ford 
"GT." Defendant's Trial Exhibit 12; see also "How the GT40 became just the GT," Automotive 
News, October 21, 2002 (Addendum "G" hereto); "Ford Forced to Rename GT40 Sports Car," 
Automotive News, November 4, 2002 (Addendum "E" hereto); "Just a GT," Road & Track, 
January 2003 (Addendum "F" hereto). As the preceding authorities, including Defendant's Trial 
Exhibit 12 indicate, Ford Motor Co. shortened the name of the model from "GT40" to "GT" 
between the introduction of the vehicle and announcement that it would be put into production, 
and its delivery to dealers 2-3 years later. Although Ford Motor Co. shortened the name it gave 
to the model, that does not mean that the "GT" was a different model than the one for which the 
parties contracted. Henry Day Ford, at trial, produced no evidence that the Ford GTs it was 
subsequently allocated were a vehicle model different from the GT40 that Kersey identified in its 
contracts with Watkins. Henry Day Ford's Trial Exhibit 12, moreover, indicates that what was 
initially announced as the GT40 was later put into production as the GT. The two are the same 
model. 
The vehicle model that Watkins desired to buy, when it later became available to the 
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public, was the vehicle that Ford Motor Co. had recently introduced at the Detroit Auto Show as 
the"GT40." Watkins testified in this regard: 
Q. [by Watkins' attorney]. Was there an actual automobile that was 
displayed at the Detroit Auto Show that you described? 
A. [Watkins] Yes. 
Q. And how was that automobile described? 
A. The Ford GT40. 
Q. Now at some point did you determine that you would try to 
purchase one of these automobiles? 
A. Yes. As soon as Bill Ford announced that they were going to 
build it. 
Tr. 40:25- 41:8. On cross examination, Watkins testified as follows in response to a question 
that asked if he "just wanted to buy a Ford GT40?" 
Q. [by Henry Day Ford's attorney]. Okay. Isn't it true, sir, that you 
just wanted to buy a Ford GT40? 
A. Not just a Ford GT40. I wanted to buy the car that was known at 
that time as the Ford GT40 and the car that Mr. Kersey and I both 
described at the time as being the Ford GT40. 
Tr. 72:9-13. 
For a contract to be formed, there must "be a meeting of the minds of the parties, which 
must be spelled out, either expressly or implicitly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced." 
Valcarce v. Bitters. 362 P.2d 427, 428 (Utah 1961). In using, in March 2002, the term "GT40" 
in their contracts, the parties meant the subject of their contracts to be the vehicle/model that 
Ford had introduced two months before as the "GT40," and which it announced would be put 
into production. They did not use the term "GT" because the vehicle had not yet been given that 
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name. Subject to its future allocation of and receipt of the model, Henry Day Ford promised to 
sell the identified vehicle to Watkins. It promised to sell two if it got them. Although Ford, in 
the process of taking the vehicle through the process from a concept car, through design and 
production, shortened the name to "GT," that did not make it a vehicle other than the one for 
which the parties contracted. 
Henry Day Ford's interpretation of the "GT40" as some other vehicle than that 
introduced in early 2002 as the "GT40" but which evolved into the "GT," requires the court to 
presume that the subject matter of the parties' contract was some mythical vehicle that might-
just might someday be produced by Ford and might someday be made available to dealers. See 
cross-examination of Tom Watkins, Tr. 74:22; Jeremy Day Testimony, Tr. 139:21-23; Henry Day 
Ford's Closing Argument at Tr. 178. This interpretation ignores entirely the purpose for which 
the parties contracted. 
Henry Day Ford's expectation in March 2002 that it might be allocated a Ford GT40 also 
belies its present argument, that "GT40" refers to a vehicle that was never produced. The above 
cited testimony by Kersey, Watkins and Day, and especially Defendant's Exhibit 12, supports 
Watkins' argument that the term "GT40," as the parties used that term in 2002 to refer to the 
vehicle/ model that Ford had introduced as the GT40 and announced it would put into 
production, includes the vehicle/ model that Ford renamed the "GT" in the course of production 
and later made available to dealers. As this is a plausible interpretation of the parties' use in 
2002 of the term "GT40," it makes the reference to "GT40" in the contracts at least ambiguous. 
Accordingly, the trial court erred when it concluded that the terms of the parties' contract were 
clear and unambiguous and, that because the subject matter of the contracts was, unambiguously, 
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"GT40s," Henry Day Ford did not breach the contracts when it was allocated and received its 
first two Ford "GTs." 
D. The Existence of an Integration Clause in the Contracts Does Nothing to Clarify 
what the Parties Meant by their Reference to "GT40." Moreover, an Integration 
Clause does not Bar Resort to Extrinsic Evidence to Interpret the Parties' 
Intentions. 
Henry Day Ford makes much of the fact that the parties' contract includes an "integration 
clause." The fact that the contracts contain an integration clause, though, does not help to clarify 
what the parties intended by their use of the term "GT40." According to Corbin, " Even if a 
written document has been assented to as the complete and accurate integration of the terms of a 
contract, it must still be interpreted; and all those factors that are of assistance in this process 
may be proved by oral testimony." 6 Corbin on Contracts, §579 at 120 (1979). The facial 
ambiguity of the term is not made clear by forsaking all extrinsic evidence (which, incidentally, 
includes (1) Steve Kersey's acknowledgment that the "GT" was the same vehicle he had 
identified as the "GT40" when he prepared the contracts and (2) defendant's Trial Exhibit 12), 
and trying instead to determine the meaning of the term by reference only to "GT40" and other 
terms "within the four corners" of the contract. 
In Hessler v Crystal Lake Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 338 111. App. 3d 1010, 788 N.E.2d 
405 (2003), the Illinois Court of Appeals reviewed a case which involved a contract for the sale 
and purchase of a limited production vehicle, a Plymouth Prowler, the future production of 
which remained uncertain when plaintiff and dealer entered into their contract. A lawsuit ensued 
when the dealer was later allocated a Prowler, but refused to sell it to plaintiff. The dispute 
required that the court interpret certain terms used in the parties' written contract. The dealer, 
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noting that its contract included an integration clause, argued that the court could therefore not 
consider extrinsic evidence to interpret the disputed term. The court held: 
Although we do not quarrel with defendant's assertion that 
the Agreement is completely integrated, we do not agree 
with defendant's contention that extrinsic evidence may not be 
used to interpret the contract. Application of the parol evidence 
rule determines only which terms are contained in the parties' final 
agreement. 801 ILCS 5/2-207 (West 2000). It does not preclude 
the admission of extrinsic evidence to interpret those terms, 
[citations omitted]. 
788N.E.2dat413. 
Moreover, Utah Code §70A-2-202 permits terms even in a purportedly integrated 
agreement to be explained, though not contradicted, by reference to extrinsic evidence. An 
example of this analysis being applied to facts similar to those in this case is found in Bell v. 
Stephens, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18600 (S.D.N.Y.). It is cited here in part because the case 
involved interpretation of what was determined to be ambiguous provisions in a contract for the 
sale and purchase of a 2005 Ford GT. The contract did not specify a vehicle identification 
number or a delivery date, as the dealer had not yet been allocated a 2005 Ford GT. Even 
though the contract included an integration clause, the court held that it was proper to consider 
extrinsic evidence in order to explain, but not contradict, contract terms. Specifically, the Court 
stated that: 
In an integrated agreement "[w]here the language employed. .. 
is ambiguous or equivocal, the parties may submit parol evidence 
concerning the facts and surrounding the making of the 
agreement in order to demonstrate the intent of the parties. 
Ralli v. Tavern on the Green, 566 F. Supp. 329, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983); Adler and Shavkin v. Wachner, 721 F. Supp. 472, 479 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988). Such parol evidence shall not be admitted, 
however, if offered to contradict the terms of the written 
agreement. Farmer v. Arabian American Oil Co., 277 F.2d 
28 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
46, 49 (2d Cir. 1960). Traditionally, the analysis as to whether 
an agreement's terms are ambiguous is conducted based on the 
provision that are within the four corners of the document. See 
Alder & Shavkin v. Wachner, 721 F. Supp. at 479. Here, 
considering that the Assignment details only the make, model, 
year and sales price of the very expensive subject automobile, 
ambiguity exists as to significant features of the car and details of 
the transaction such as the source of the vehicle and the timing of the 
contemplated transaction. An alleged oral argument as the car's color, 
features, origin and date of deliver would not seem to contradict the 
express terms of the Assignment, nor would a term setting a deadline 
for delivery. Accordingly, and despite the paragraph eight integration 
clause, this Court may consider Defendants' proffered evidence of a 
delivery term. 
The trial court, in sum, erred when it concluded, as a matter of law, that Henry Day Ford 
did not breach its contracts when Watkins demanded that it sell to him two of the Ford GTs it 
had received, because the contracts "clearly," "unambiguously," and "plainly" specified the sale 
and purchase of Ford "GT40's." 
2. The Evidence Before the Trial Court Did Not Establish a "Distinct Intent" by 
Tom Watkins to Waive his Contractual Right to Purchase Two Ford GT 40s, or Ford GTs 
as they were later named. Nor did the Evidence that was before the Court Establish an 
Abandonment of his Contractual Rights. 
Watkins, on appeal, contends that the evidence at trial did not support the trial court's 
findings of fact or conclusions of law that he waived or abandoned his rights to enforce his 
contracts on Henry Day Ford's receipt of the first two GTs. Watkins, on appeal, as he did at 
trial, Tr. 68: 20-25, denies that he intentionally or knowingly waived his contractual rights. 
The Trial Court's Findings of Fact, that pertain to the question of waiver and 
abandonment, are as follows: 
23. At the end of 2002, after defendant had held plaintiffs 
deposit for over eight months, Jeremy Day inquired why plaintiffs 
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deposit was being held since there had been no indication that the 
defendant would be allocated any Ford GT 40's. 
24. Jeremy Day, in December of 2002, called the 
defendant's Ford representative to inquire if defendant would be 
allotted any Ford GT 40fs. 
25. Ford indicated to Mr. Day, in effect, that the defendant 
was not, as a smaller Ford dealer going to be allotted any Ford GT 
40's unless the defendant won the Ford President's Award or 
Ford's National Car and Truck Share Award. 
26. Defendant had never, in its 40 year history, received 
either the President's Award or National Share Award from Ford. 
27. Based upon the fact that defendant would not be 
allocated a Ford GT 40 to sell, the defendant, on December 31, 
2002, returned plaintiffs $2000.00 deposit with a letter which 
stated: "[e]nclosed please find a check for the refund of deposit on 
your vehicle order. We regret to inform you that our allocation is 
not going to allow us to receive this vehicle." 
28. Though plaintiff, as noted above is an experienced 
automobile dealer and as such would be very familiar with 
industry practices, he negotiated the return of his deposit without 
objection or reservation of any type. Based upon plaintiffs 
experience in the auto dealership industry, plaintiffs claim that he 
deposited the check because he did not know what to do with the 
check lacks credibility. Plaintiff made no attempt whatsoever to 
communicate any concerns he had with the letter and the check, 
nor made any attempts within a reasonable time of receiving the 
letter and check to assert or enforce his contractual rights. 
29. It was not until February 2004, over two years after 
plaintiff accepted the return of his deposit, that defendant learned 
that it would be allocated a Ford GT based upon defendant being 
awarded the Share of the Nation Award for the 2003 sales year. 
30. In April 2004, defendant was notified by Ford that it 
would be receiving the President's Award based upon defendant's 
2003 automobile sales and would be allocated another Ford GT. 
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40. Plaintiff, by his acceptance of his deposit without 
reservation, objection, or condition, unequivocally demonstrated 
his abandonment of the Contracts. 
41. Plaintiffs demand that the Contracts be honored by 
defendant over two (2) years after plaintiff accepted a return of his 
deposit is unreasonable. The Court finds that defendant returned 
plaintiff s check in good faith and based upon the reasonable belief 
that they would not be allotted any Ford GT 40fs. 
42. Plaintiff, by his actions, unequivocally demonstrated 
his intent to relinquish his rights to purchase the subject vehicles 
from defendant. 
R. 632-635. Watkins especially challenges the Court's Findings numbered 28, 40, 41, and 42. 
Watkins also challenges the Court's conclusions of law on waiver and abandonment which were 
as follows: 
8. Defendant's return of plaintiff s deposit represented 
conduct inconsistent with the continued existence of the Contract, 
and plaintiffs negotiation of defendant's check in the amount of 
$2,000.00 without reservation of objection constituted conduct 
inconsistent with the continued existence of the Contract after the 
plaintiff negotiated the return of his deposit. 
9. The Court finds the parties abandoned the Contracts. 
10. Plaintiff s acceptance and return of his deposit and his 
subsequent inaction clearly demonstrate plaintiffs voluntary 
relinquishment of his known rights particularly with plaintiffs 
experience in the auto dealership industry and both parties' 
uncertainty as to when and if defendant would receive the 
contracted vehicles. 
R. 636. 
A. Waiver is the Intentional Relinquishment of a Known Right 
Legal rights, including contract rights, can be waived. According to the Utah Supreme 
Court: 
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A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. 
To constitute waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit 
or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an intention 
to relinquish it. 
Soter's v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan, 857 P. 2d 935, 942 (Utah 1993)(emphasis added). 
Intent to relinquish a legal right, according to Soter's must be "distinct." As the Utah 
Supreme Court put it, 
We further clarify that the intent to relinquish a right must 
be distinct. Under this legal standard, a fact finder need only 
determine whether the totality of circumstances "warrants the 
inference of relinquishment." 
Soter's, 942 (emphasis added). According to Black's Law Dictionary, "distinct" means: 
Clear to the senses or mind; easily perceived or understood; plain; 
unmistakable. Evidently not identical; observably or decidedly 
different. 
Black's Law Dictionary (West Publishing, Deluxe 5th Edition, 1979). A distinct intent, thus, 
would seem to mean an intent that is "clear to. . . the mind," "plain" or "unmistakeable." The 
adjective "distinct," in other words, suggests something more than proof of mere intent. 
"A distinct intent to waive must. . . be shown by a preponderance of the evidence." Soter's, 
942 n.6 (emphasis added).6 
6Proof of waiver, under the standard established by Soter's, requires that the party which 
contends another party has waived his rights, must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
that the conduct of the other manifested a distinct intent - not just an intent - to waive his rights. 
As the Supreme Court acknowledged in Soter's, 
We recognize that there is an inherent contradiction between 
requiring "distinct" intent while permitting it to be established by a 
preponderance only. It might make the matter clearer if the burden of 
persuasion on intent were "clear and convincing," as some jurisdictions 
require for waiver or estoppel, see, e.g., Pacific Valley Bank v Schwenke, 
189 Cal. App. 3d 134. 234 Cal. Rptr. 298. 305 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (waiver); 
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A waiver of a known right "must be distinctly made, although it may be express or 
implied." Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P. 2d 1291, 1294 (Utah 1978). Although an intent to waive 
rights may be implied, the "general principle in our case law [is] that '[m]ere silence is not a 
waiver unless there is some duty or obligation to speak.'" Id., 940; Geisdorf v. Doughty, 972 
P.2d 67, 73 (Utah 1988). "Although [an intent to relinquish a right] may be express or implied 
[Soters at 941], it 'will not be implied from doubtful acts.'" Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, 2003 UT 
51,1J84, 82 P.3d 1076 (quoting 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver §160 at 845 (1966)). "When 
waiver is to be implied from conduct, the acts, conduct, or circumstances relied upon to show 
waiver must make out a clear case." 31 C.J.S. Estoppel and Waiver §290 at 706 (2008). 
"Waiver will not be inferred from slight circumstances or on slight proof, and is not to be lightly 
inferred in the face of a clearly expressed intention to insist on the right alleged to have been 
waived." Id at 705. 
"Waiver of a contractual right," as distinct from a general legal right, occurs, according 
to the Utah Supreme Court, " when a party to a contract intentionally acts in a manner 
inconsistent with its contractual rights, and, as a result prejudice accrues to the opposing party or 
parties to the contract." Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, p i , 71 P.3d 589; Mid-America Pipeline 
Co. v. Four- Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43,1fl7, 216 P.3d 352. 
Dressel v Weeks, 779 P.2d 324 (Alaska 1989) ( estoppel); Collins Agency v 
Hagerott, 211 Mont. 303, 684 P.2d 487 (Mont. 1982) (estoppel), and the 
"distinct" requirement were dropped. We have no occasion, however, to 
consider that matter today. 
Soter's, 942 n.6 (emphasis added). Watkins submits that the better rule of proof necessary to 
prove waiver would be that it should be proven by clear and convincing evidence. At the very 
least, a "clear and convincing" standard that would be easier to comprehend and explain. 
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B. Abandonment of a Contractual Right is the Intentional Relinquishment of One's 
Rights in a Contract. 
Parties may by their conduct abandon a contract. "Abandonment" however means "the 
intentional relinquishment of one's rights in the contract; and in order to nullify such rights, 
there must be a clear and unequivocal showing of such abandonment." Lucky Seven Rodeo 
Corp. v. Clark. 755 P.2d 750, 753 (Utah App. 1988); see also Eldridge v. Famsworih, 2007 UT 
App 243,^25, 166 P.3d 639. 
C. Because Waiver and Abandonment present mixed questions of fact and law, an 
Appellant who Challenges a Trial Court's Findings and Conclusions as to Waiver and 
Abandonment must Marshall the Evidence and Argument in Favor of the Court's 
Findings and Conclusions. 
Because intent involves a state of mind, it is a particularly fact- sensitive issue. Waiver, 
thus, presents a mixed question of fact and law. United Park City Mines v. Stichting Mayflower 
Mt. Fonds, 2006 UT 35, «pi, 140 P.3d 1200. So does abandonment. An appellant who 
challenges a trial court's findings/ conclusions that he waived his legal rights, must" first 
marshal all evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally 
insufficient to support the finding even while viewing it in a light most favorable to the court 
below." Chen v. Stewart. 2004 UT 82,1176, 100 P. 3d 1177. 
D. What facts and argument support the trial court's findings of fact and 
conclusions of law that Watkins distinctly intended to waive his contractual rights? 
There are four documents relevant to Henry Day Ford's affirmative defenses of waiver 
and abandonment: the two motor vehicle contracts of sale, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 2; the letter 
delivered by Henry Day Ford dated December 31, 2002, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 4; and the check 
in the amount of $2000 that accompanied the letter, Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 3. 
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A summary of what "facts" support the conclusions of law the court made as to waiver 
and abandonment, starts with what Henry Day Ford argued to the Court in this regard. In its 
Trial Brief, Henry Day Ford argued that: 
Upon receipt of his $2,000.00 deposit from Defendant, 
Plaintiff negotiated the check without objection or reservation. 
The Plaintiff then had no further contact with Defendant for 2-1/2 
years, until June 2005 when he demanded to buy a Ford GT from 
Defendant even though the Plaintiff and Defendant never had an 
agreement referencing a Ford GT. 
Plaintiffs acceptance of his deposit was inconsistent with 
the continued existence of the Contracts. Plaintiff, because of the 
lapse of time it held the Plaintiffs deposit and the Defendant by 
his undisputed actions demonstrated he believed that he had also 
abandoned the contracts. 
R. 540,547. 
In its closing argument, Henry Day Ford argued that Watkins had waived and abandoned 
his contractual rights, although it did not make clear what 'Tacts" it believed established waiver. 
Tr. 168-173. Henry Day Ford coupled a reference to Soter's with the argument that because 
Watkins negotiated the check, "there was no longer any consideration supporting the contract," 
Tr. 168. In response to the rhetorical question, " what did plaintiff do?": Henry Day Ford 
answered, "[he] took the check, held on to it, cashed it, and was disappointed." Tr. 171. 
Watkins' use of the word "disappointed," according to Henry Day Ford, "references an 
abandonment of the contract." Tr. 171. 
Henry Day Ford's most complete argument on the subject of waiver and abandonment, 
though, is expressed in a two page memorandum to the Court dated March 9, 2009, R. 568-569, 
which was submitted in response to a query by the Court about when does a person have a duty 
to speak, on the risk that his silence will establish waiver or abandonment. Henry Day Ford 
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stated its case, as follows: 
Undisputedly, Plaintiff, as an experienced automobile 
dealer, knew his rights under the Contracts, and was clearly 
demonstrated his intention to relinquish those rights when he 
negotiated the $2,000.00 check. Waiver may be implied from 
conduct or silence. Soter's at 940. In this case, Plaintiffs 
conduct, cashing the check, and his silence, not contacting 
Defendant until June 2005, over two years after receiving the 
check, constitutes a waiver of the Contracts. 
Plaintiff did nothing to protect his own interest. Plaintiff s 
silence by not contacting Defendant upon receipt of the $2,000.00 
check or at any other time prior to June 2005 also demonstrated 
Plaintiff s waiver of his rights under the Contracts. Clearly, 
Plaintiffs actions were inconsistent with the Contracts and 
Plaintiff s later demand on Defendant that Defendant honor the 
Contracts prejudiced Defendant. 
R. 568. 
The evidence that supports the trial court's findings and conclusions consists primarily of 
Watkins' receipt and negotiation in early 2003 of a check presented to him by Henry Day Ford in 
the amount of $2,000 (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 4, p.2)- the amount of the down payment he had 
given to Henry Day Ford in March 2002 .7 Additional facts that arguably establish wavier 
and/or abandonment include: 
(1) That Watkins did not, on receipt of Henry Day Ford's letter, call Henry Day Ford to 
protest the return of his down payment. Watkins cross-examination, Tr. 80:5-9; Day, Tr. 140:19-
25. 
(2) That Watkins did not, on receipt of Henry Day Ford's letter, call and ask that Henry 
7
 The check for the down payment that Watkins gave to Henry Day Ford in March 2002 
is Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 3. 
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Day Ford keep his down payment. Day, Tr. 140:23-25. 
(3) That Watkins negotiated the check without expressly reserving his rights. Argument; 
see Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 12. 
(4) That Watkins' negotiation of Henry Day Ford's check signaled an abandonment of 
his contractual rights, and was conduct inconsistent with his subsequent request that Henry Day 
Ford honor the contracts. Argument. 
(5) That Watkins, having negotiated the check for $2000, remained silent for the next 2 Vi 
years and did nothing during that time period to exercise of protect his rights. Argument. 
(6) That Watkins, as an experienced motor vehicle dealer, knew the significance of 
accepting and negotiating Henry Day Ford's check for the return of his down payment. 
Argument. 
E. The Evidence and Argument as Marshaled, does not Establish a Distinct 
Intention by Watkins to Waive his Contractual Rights. 
Nowhere in the Trial Court's findings or conclusions did the trial court find or conclude 
that Watkins' conduct established a "distinct" intent to waive his contractual rights, although the 
Court, as it expressed it, found that "Plaintiff by his actions, unequivocally demonstrated his 
intent to relinquish his rights." Finding of Fact no. 42, R.635. The evidence, when marshaled, 
however, is insufficient to prove a distinct intention by Watkins to waive his contractual rights. 
In stark contrast to the trial Court's conclusions of law, it should first be noted that Mr. 
Watkins, in testifying at trial, denied that he intended to waive his contract rights:: 
Q. When you received the Henry Day letter of December 31, 2002, 
and cashed the check, was it your desire to terminate those contracts? 
A. No. 
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Q. Was it your intention to terminate those contracts? 
A. N o . ' • 
Watkins, Tr. 68:20-25. Any conclusion that Watkins intended to waive or abandon his contract 
rights must therefore be inferred from his conduct under the circumstances. 
The representation that Henry Day Ford made in the letter which accompanied the 
returned check is of critical importance in determining whether Watkins' negotiation of the 
check establishes his "distinct intent" to waive his contractual rights. The letter, Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit 4, stated as follows: 
12-31-2002 
Dear Sir, 
Enclosed please find a check for the refund of deposit on your vehicle 
order. 
We regret to inform you that our allocation is not going to allow us to 




Henry Day Ford, Inc. 
Henry Day Ford's letter unequivocally advised Watkins that "our allocation is not going to allow 
us to receive this vehicle." In other words, it stated to Watkins that the condition precedent on 
which its performance and contractual duties were premised was not going to occur. Watkins 
cashed the check, he said at trial, "because it was accompanied by a letter saying they were not 
going to get cars, and that was a possibility from the outset." Tr. 80:16-20. Watkins' 
negotiation of the check, given Henry Day Ford's statement that it was not going to "receive this 
vehicle," reflects nothing more than Watkins took Henry Day Ford at its word. 
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Of critical importance in determining whether Watkins intentionally waived a right that 
was known to him, is what the letter failed to disclose: that when Henry Day Ford wrote the 
letter, a possibility remained that Ford Motor Co. might allocate to it a Ford GT, or GT 40 as 
Ford and the parties initially called it, if it were to win Ford's President's Award or its Share of 
the Nation Award. Day, Tr. 148:11-149:19. Although Henry Day Ford on December 31, 2002 
perhaps thought it unlikely that it would win either award in the foreseeable future, it did know, 
as of December 31, 2002, that it remained a possibility that it might win one of the awards and, 
therefore, be allocated one or more of the vehicles. 
Henry Day Ford's 12/31/2002 letter did not, however, disclose that it was still possible 
that Henry Day Ford might be allocated one or more Ford GT 40's. It did not state to Watkins 
that it "might not" be allocated any vehicles and, given the uncertainty of its allocation, ask 
Watkins if he wished to rescind the contracts, upon which it would refund the deposits. Instead, 
Henry Day Ford stated unequivocally that it would not be receiving the vehicles it had 
contracted with Watkins to sell. Watkins, given Henry Day Ford's unequivocal statement that it 
was not going to receive any of "this vehicle," was therefore unaware that he retained any right 
to purchase a Ford GT40/ GT, which could arise only if Ford Motor Co. later allocated any of 
the vehicles to Henry Day Ford. A person cannot knowingly waive a contractual right he 
does not know he has. As Watkins did not know that Henry Day Ford, contrary to the 
content of its letter, remained eligible for a future allocation of one or more Ford GT's, he 
cannot be said to have intentionally waived his right to purchase the first and second GTs 
that Ford Motor Co. later allocated to Henry Day Ford. 
If Henry Day Ford intended the return of Watkins' payment to discharge its obligation to 
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sell Watkins a GT or GT40 if, despite its pessimism, it was subsequently allocated a GT or 
GT40, it disguised well its intent. If it presumed that Watkins, by negotiating the check, would 
be waiving his right to purchase a Ford GT, which remained subject to a condition precedent, it 
hid that thought from Watkins. Henry Day Ford did not, in presenting its check to Watkins, 
offer it in return for a waiver of Watkins' rights under the contracts. It did not ask Watkins to 
waive his contractual rights. It did not state or suggest that it was seeking to escape its 
obligations under the contracts. Henry Day Ford did not advise Watkins that if he negotiated the 
check, it would presume he had waived his right to purchase "this vehicle" if it later was 
allocated the vehicle. The check contained no restrictive endorsement. 
A distinct waiver by Watkins of his contract rights cannot reasonably be inferred by his 
failure to call Henry Day Ford on receipt of its letter and "stamp his feet" or otherwise complain 
about the return of his down payment. What cause would he have to do that? None, unless he 
thought Henry Day Ford was lying to him. Henry Day Ford, as a Ford dealer, was in a better 
position than Watkins to know if any possibility remained that it might receive the limited 
production vehicles that were the subject of its contracts with Watkins. When it said, "our 
allocation is not going to allow us to receive this vehicle," Watkins had no reason to protest, 
challenge, or even question the representation. He had no duty or reason to respond to Henry 
Day Ford's "matter of fact" statement. His "silence," again, reflects nothing more than he took 
Henry Day Ford at its word, and that he negotiated its check "because it was accompanied by a 
letter saying they were not going to get cars, and that was a possibility from the outset." 
Watkins, Tr.80:16-20. Waiver cannot be implied from doubtful acts. Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, 
2003 UT 51, [^84. "It should not be inferred from slight circumstances or on slight proof." 31 
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C J.S. Estoppel and Waiver, §290 at 705 (2008). According to Geisdorf 73, "mere silence is not 
a waiver unless there is some duty or obligation to speak." The only circumstance which 
Watkins can conceive in which he might have had an obligation to "speak up" or otherwise 
protest Henry Day Ford's return of his down payment would be if he knew, or had reason to 
believe that Henry Day Ford's statement that it would not be receiving "this vehicle" was 
incorrect. Watkins, though, had no reason to doubt Henry Day Ford's statement. 
Watkins' mere act of negotiating the check, furthermore, cannot be seen as inconsistent 
with his contract rights, it if was a fact, as of December 31, 2002, that Henry Day Ford's future 
allocations were not going to allow it to receive a GT40 or GT as it was later called. It might be 
inconsistent only if Watkins thought, Henry Day Ford's express assurance to the contrary, that 
the condition precedent on which the contractual obligations depended might still occur. 
Waiver also cannot be inferred based on Watkins' failure to demand performance by 
Henry Day Ford for 2 Vi years following his negotiation of its check. The scheduled date of 
performance was not March 4, 2002, the date of the contracts. Henry Day Ford's performance, 
instead, was conditioned on its future contingent allocation of the vehicles for which Watkins 
and Henry Day Ford contracted, which the parties contemplated would be two or more years. As 
Henry Day Ford would have no obligation to sell Watkins a GT unless and until it was allocated 
one, the mere passage of time - a little over two years following December 31, 2002 - is not 
evidence of waiver. Moreover, the uncontradicted evidence at trial was that Watkins, on first 
learning that Ford had allocated GTs to Henry Day Ford immediately went to Henry Day Ford 
with contracts in hand and demanded that it sell him the two GTs it had been allocated. 
Finally, the trial court ascribed special significance to the fact that Watkins owns a motor 
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vehicle dealership. See Finding of Fact no. 28 (R.636) and Conclusion of Law no. 10 (R.636). 
Watkins, frankly, is at a loss to understand what difference it makes that he owns a dealership. 
He would have been in no better position than any other purchaser on December 31, 2002 to 
know if Henry Day Ford might, notwithstanding its statements to the contrary, still be in line to 
receive from Ford Motor Co. a GT40, or GT as it was later called. Presumably, the law is the 
same and applies with equal force and benefit to all persons, including owners of motor vehicle 
dealerships. 
No evidence was presented at trial concerning special knowledge held by owners of 
dealerships, generally, that would be germane to Watkins' act of cashing Henry Day Ford's 
check under the circumstances in this case. Henry Day Ford, in closing argument, linked waiver 
to consideration, implying that the return of Watkins' check constituted a "failure of 
consideration." Tr. 168. It was an argument that Henry Day Ford made in its second motion for 
summary judgment, R.384; which Watkins opposed, R.255; and which the Court rejected in the 
course of its Order dated December 5, 2008, R.476, 477 (ruling that "the mutual promises alone 
between the parties [to sell and buy] served as consideration for the contracts and that receipt by 
Plaintiff of the deposit specifically referenced in the subject contracts, without objection or 
reservation, did not cause the contracts to be unenforceable based on failure of consideration"). 
According to the Utah Supreme Court, "it is not necessary for a promisee to make a payment for 
there to be consideration; the return promise to pay [is] sufficient consideration to form the 
contract." Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance and Furniture Co., 770 P.2d 88, 91 
(Utah 1988). Mutual promises establish sufficient consideration to support a contract. Resource 
Met. Co. v. Weston Ranch. 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985). Henry Day Ford's and Watkins' 
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mutual promises remained in place and in effect even after the former's return of Watkins' down 
payment, subject of course to the condition precedent that Henry Day Ford assured Watkins was 
not going to occur. See Watkins' argument on alleged failure of consideration, in greater detail, 
at R. 255, 262-266. The contracts, thus, did not become unenforceable due to an alleged "failure 
of consideration" caused by Watkins' negotiation of Henry Day Ford's check. 
F. Henry Day Ford did not at Trial Prove that it was Prejudiced by Watkins 
Demand in June 2005 that it Sell to Him the Two Ford GTs it had been Allocated. 
In cases where contractual obligations are involved, the Utah Supreme Court has added 
to the elements that it held, in Soter's, must be proven to establish waiver. Thus, "waiver of a 
contractual right occurs when a party to the contract intentionally acts in a manner inconsistent 
with its contractual rights, and, as a result, prejudice accrues to the opposing party or parties 
to the contract." Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Williams Field Services Co., 2009 UT 43, ^ [17, 
216 P. 3d 352 (emphasis added); Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, |31 , 71 P. 3d 589. Assuming that 
the contracts entitled Watkins to purchase at MSRP the first two GTs that were allocated to 
Henry Day Ford, Henry Day Ford did not at trial prove that it was prejudiced by Watkins' 
conduct that it supposed established a waiver of his contractual rights. The trial court made no 
findings of fact or conclusions of law that address the issue of prejudice attributable to conduct 
by Watkins that is alleged to have been inconsistent with his contractual rights. 
The requirement that a person who claims that another has waived his contractual rights 
must prove that he was thereby prejudiced, coincides with the legal principle that "a waiver can 
be retracted at any time before the other party has materially changed position in reliance on the 
waiver." 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver §200 at 605 (2000); see also Max 327, Inc. v. City 
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of Portland. 115 Or. App. 342, 838 P.2d 631, 633 (1992), review denied. 846 P.2d 1161 (Or. 
1993). At least in the case of the white Ford GT Coupe, Henry Day Ford cannot maintain it was 
prejudiced by Watkins' demand that it sell him the vehicle for MSRP, as Henry Day Ford's 
owner retained the vehicle for his personal use. 
G. Henry Day Ford May Not Claim that Watkins Waived his Contractual Rights 
Where its False Representation was the Foundation for Watkins5 Alleged Waiver 
"A waiver may not be claimed by one whose false representation is the foundation of the 
waiver." 31 C.J.S. Estoppel & Waiver, §218 (2008). This legal principle is illustrated in Home 
Ins. Co. v. Thunderbird, Inc., 338 So.2d 391 (Miss. 1976). The case involved the attempted 
cancellation of an insurance policy prior to the loss that the policy insured. The specific issue 
concerning waiver was, had the insured waived the requirement that unearned premiums be 
returned to the insured as a precondition to the insurer cancelling the policy? The insurer had 
mailed a check for the unearned premium to Home's agent; however, the agent nonetheless 
assured the insured that it was covered. The Mississippi Supreme Court held as follows: 
Home's agent gave Thunderbird officials false assurance that the 
vessel was covered. Thunderbird officials had a right to believe that 
the premium was working to purchase coverage. The false statements 
of Home's agent was the act of Home. A waiver may not be claimed 
by one whose false representation is the foundation of the waiver. 
Thunderbird failed to demand return of the premium because of its 
ignorance of the true facts as to what was being done with the 
unearned premium. 
Home Ins., 394 (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in this case, Henry Day Ford falsely stated to Watkins that" our allocation is 
not going to allow us to receive this vehicle." Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit 4. This definitive 
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statement, as noted above, was incorrect, as Henry Day Ford, as of December 31, 2002, 
remained eligible to receive a future allocation of the GT40/GT if it could win either the 
President's Award of the Share of the Nation award. Jeremy Day, Tr. 147:24-149:19. It turned 
out to be untrue, as Ford Motor Co. subsequently allocated to Henry Day Ford three Ford GTs. 
Jeremy Day testified at trial that as of December 31, 2002, in good faith, he thought it 
unlikely that Henry Day Ford would earn either award and, therefore, it was unlikely to be 
allocated a Ford GT40. The trial court made findings of fact that Henry Day Ford, as of 
December 31, 2002, had been told by Ford Motor Co. that it was not "going to be allocated any 
Ford GT40s unless the defendant won the Ford President's Award of Ford's National Car and 
Truck Share Award." Finding of Fact no. 25, and that in its 40 year history, Henry Day Ford had 
won neither award, Finding of Fact no. 26 (R.632). Whether or not Henry Day Ford, as of 
December 31, 2002, truly thought that it could never win either the President's Award or the 
Share of the Nation Award is, though, beside the point. Watkins did not sue Henry Day Ford for 
fraud. He sued it for breaching a contract, which imposed on Henry Day Ford a conditional 
obligation to sell to him the first two GTs received by it, if Ford Motor Co. later allocated one or 
more GTs to Henry Day Ford. Watkins' negotiation of Henry Day Ford's check for the return of 
his $2000 down payment was premised on Henry Day Ford's false representation - whether or 
not it was in good faith - that "our allocation is not going to allow us to receive this vehicle." 
Applying the facts in this case to the court's statement in Home, Inc., Watkins negotiated Henry 
Day Ford's check "because of his ignorance of the true facts" with regard to whether or not it 
remained possible that Ford Motor Co. might still, notwithstanding Henry Day Ford's assurance 
to the contrary, be allocated one or more Ford GTs. 
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3. The Trial Court Erred in Finding that Henry Day Ford's Offer to Sell Watkins a Ford 
GT After this Action was Filed Constituted a Failure of Plaintiff to Mitigate his Damages. 
It is not evident why the trial court would make a finding of fact that Watkins failed to 
mitigate his damages, as the court never reached the question of damages. Nonetheless, the trial 
court "found" as follows: 
38. In the late summer of 2005, defendant offered to sell to plaintiff for MSRP 
the Ford GT which had been allocated to defendant.8 
39. Plaintiff refused defendants5 offer to purchase a Ford GT. Plaintiffs refusal 
to purchase the Ford GT constitutes a failure of plaintiff to mitigate his damages 
R. 634. Finding no. 39, though, amounts to a conclusion of law which should be accorded no 
deference. The findings were based on the following testimony at trial: 
Q. [Defendant's attorney, Robert Hughes]: Were you offered 
a Ford GT from Henry S. Day? 
A. [Tom Watkins]: Yes 
Q. When was that, sir? 
A. I don't know. Sometime after this. 
Q. Was it in 2005? 
A. It could have been. I was offered it through my lawyers. And I don't 
remember the date. 
Q. Okay. Was it shortly after you went into the dealership, sir? 
A. I don't think it was shortly after, no. 
Q. What was your answer to the offer to sell you a Ford GT, sir? 
8No evidence at trial established that Henry Day Ford's offer was made in "late summer 
of 2005." Nonetheless, assuming the date of the offer was "late summer 2005," it was clearly 
made after this lawsuit was filed. 
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A. I declined it. 
Q. And were they offering to sell it to you for MSRP? 
A. Yes. 
Tr.107: 3-19. By late summer 2005, though, this action had already been filed. It was filed on 
July 1, 2005. R. 1. Henry Day Ford's belated offer to sell Watkins a Ford GT for MSRP was 
thus in the nature of a settlement offer, communicated to him through his lawyers. 
If Watkins was entitled to damages for breach of contract, then his damages would be 
measured as of the date of Henry Day Ford's breach, which would be no later than June 8, 2005 
when Watkins demanded that Henry Day Ford sell to him the two Ford GTs it had been 
allocated. Watkins, Tr. 55. As time passed, the market value of the Ford GT depreciated 
significantly. Watkins, Tr. 83:5-8. 
In Mallek v. City of San Benito, 121 F. 3d 993 ( 5th Cir. 1997), the city based its motion 
for summary judgment, in part, on plaintiffs alleged failure to mitigate his damages by refusing 
to accept the City's offer of employment. In rejecting this argument, the 5th Circuit held that a 
duty to mitigate damages "does not include the duty to accept a new and different bargain with 
terms less favorable than those to which [a party] had previously agreed." Id., 997. Watkins, 
after this lawsuit was filed, was not required to abandon his remedy for damages measured at the 
time of Henry Day Ford's breach and accept Henry Day Ford's belated offer to sell him a Ford 
GT at MSRP on penalty that his rejection of the offer would be deemed a failure to mitigate his 
damages. 
4. The Court of Appeals Should Vacate the Trial Court's Award and Judgment 
for Attorneys Fees in favor of Henry Day Ford. 
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Henry Day Ford's judgment for attorneys fees was founded on an attorneys fee clause in 
the parties' contracts. Therefore, if the Court of Appeals holds that Henry Day Ford did breach 
its contract, or if it reverses the trial court and remands the case for further proceedings, then the 
court's award of attorneys fees to Henry Day Ford should be vacated - as the award would be 
without legal basis. If the Court of Appeals affirms the trial court's conclusions that Henry Day 
Ford did not breach its contracts with Watkins when it refused to sell to him the first two Ford 
GTs it had been allocated, then Watkins concedes that Henry Day Ford was entitled to recover of 
Watkins its reasonable attorneys fees. 
X. APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR RELIEF ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests the following relief on appeal: 
1. That the Court of Appeals reverse the trial court's conclusions of law 1-6 and 11 and 
related findings of fact, to the effect that the parties' use of the term "GT40" was clear and 
unambiguous, that the "GT40" was, unambiguously, something other than the "GT" that Ford 
subsequently distributed to its dealers, and that Henry Day Ford, thus, did not breach its 
contracts with Watkins when it refused to sell to him the first two "GTs" that Ford allocated to it. 
2. That the Court of Appeals hold, in light of the surrounding circumstances and the 
parties' intentions at the time, that the subject matter of the parties' contracts was a concept car 
that Ford Motor Co. introduced as the GT40 at the North American International Auto Show in 
Detroit, in January 2002, which Ford announced would be put into production and later 
distributed to its dealers, and which it later put into production and distributed to its dealers as 
theuGT." 
3. That the Court of Appeals reverse the trial court's conclusions of law and related 
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findings of fact that Watkins intentionally waived or abandoned his contractual right to enforce 
his contracts with Henry Day Ford, to purchase up to two Ford GTs at MSRP if Ford Motor 
Company subsequently allocated those vehicles to Henry Day Ford. 
4. That the Court of Appeals hold that Henry Day Ford breached its contracts with 
Watkins when it (1) received two "GTs" and did not make them available to Watkins at MSRP, 
and (2) refused to sell them to Watkins when he demanded that it sell to him the vehicles at 
MSRP. 
5. That the Court remand the case for a determination of what damages Watkins 
sustained as a consequence of Henry Day Ford's breach of its contract. 
6. That the Court of Appeals vacate the trial court's award and judgment of attorneys 
fees in favor of Henry Day Ford, and remand to the trial court the question of which party is 
entitled to recover attorneys fees, and in what amount. 
7. That the case be remanded with instructions that Watkins' declination of a post-
complaint offer by Henry Day Ford to sell him a GT at MSRP does not establish a failure by 
Watkins to mitigate his damages. 
8. That the case be remanded to the trial court for a redetermination of all issues, 
consistent with the opinion to be issued by the Court of Appeals 
9. That the Court of Appeals award to Appellant his costs and attorneys fees incurred on 
appeal. 
Dated: December , 2009 
By 
P. Bryan Fishburn 
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